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Integration Reclaimed:  A Review of Gary Peller’s 
Critical Race Consciousness 
MICHELLE ADAMS 
Integration occupies a contested and often paradoxical place in legal 
and public policy scholarship and the American imagination.  Today, more 
Americans are committed to integration than ever before.  Yet this 
attachment to integration is hardly robust.  There is a widespread 
perception that integration has failed.  A vanishingly small percentage of 
social and economic resources are spent on integration.  At the same time, 
some progressives and those who would otherwise consider themselves on 
the “left” criticize integration as insufficiently attentive to economic 
equality and dismissive of black identity and culture.  Scholars from across 
the political spectrum have sought to explain this disconnect and to assess 
the possibilities of integration as a political program, moral ideal, and 
social agenda. 
In his recent book, Critical Race Consciousness: Reconsidering 
American Ideologies of Racial Justice, Professor Gary Peller joins this 
robust and ongoing conversation.  Peller’s central claim is not that 
integration has had too little influence over the shape of racial equality 
and social policy, but that it has had too much.  One must him credit for 
intervening in this important discussion.  Peller’s intervention is to argue 
for a muscular, nuanced, and sophisticated understanding of black 
nationalism as it posed an ideological alternative to integration.  His 
central achievement is to add value to the scholarly discussion about a 
critical issue: What is the meaning of racial justice, and did (and does) 
integration help us achieve it? 
Ultimately, however, Peller’s argument was not convincing.  His 
capture of integration as having footing solely in individualistic race 
neutrality is problematic for at least three reasons.  First, it misses the 
structural dimensions of the integration ideology.  Instead, integration is 
actually quite radical because of its laser-like focus on racial segregation, 
which structures, maintains, and perpetuates inequality across virtually 
every indicia of social, political, educational, and economic well-being.  
Second, it misconstrues the extent to which integration has been accepted 
as a goal in the United States.  Third, it mischaracterizes the extent to 
which integration, as distinguished from an ideology of individualistic race 
neutrality, has led to current views of equal protection law.  In this Book 
Review, I support my critique of Critical Race Consciousness, and my 
affirmative claim about the virtues of integration by referencing history, 
legal analysis, and current debates about how best to achieve racial 
equality. 
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Integration Reclaimed:  A Review of Gary Peller’s 
Critical Race Consciousness 
MICHELLE ADAMS∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Integration occupies a contested and often paradoxical place in legal 
and public policy scholarship and the American imagination.  It often is 
characterized as “[t]he nation’s official civil rights policy”1 and as the 
“ultimate definition of racial justice.”2  Most whites (and blacks) embrace 
the principle of racial equality and integration.3  Thus, the “norm holds that 
black Americans deserve the same treatment as whites, and in addition, 
that racial integration in all public spheres of life is a desirable goal.”4  
Today, more Americans are committed to integration than at any time in 
the past.5 
Yet, this attachment to integration is hardly robust.  While blacks 
support integration, they do not “crave” it.6  There is a widespread 
perception that integration has “failed.”7  A vanishingly small percentage 
of social and economic (including federal budgetary) resources are spent 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School.  This Book Review was made possible by the generous financial 
support of the Cardozo Law School Summer Research Stipend Program.  I would like to thank Rachel 
Godsil, Tristin Green, Thomas Healy, Randall Kennedy, Robin Lenhardt, Melissa Murray, Laura 
Nelsen, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Alex Reinert, Zelma Rios, Kate Shaw, Catherine Smith, and Peggy 
Smith for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Book Review.  Finally, I extend thanks to 
Martina Davis, Kyle Epstein, and Jason Starr for outstanding research assistance. 
1 ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 1 
(1996). 
2 GARY PELLER, CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: RECONSIDERING AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES OF 
RACIAL JUSTICE, at xiv (2011). 
3 Lawrence D. Bobo & Camille Z. Charles, Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan 
Report to the Obama Candidacy, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245 (2009). 
4 HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
311–12 (1997). 
5  SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 11–12 (2004). 
6 Id. at xii. 
7 See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 1, at 1 (“For all of its moral and political appeal, however, racial 
integration has been an unsuccessful civil rights strategy.”); Eric Foner & Randall Kennedy, 
Reclaiming Integration, NATION, Dec. 14, 1998, at 11, 11 (“Books continue to appear with the word 
[integration] in their titles, but most seem resigned to integration’s failure, treating it as an ongoing 
‘ordeal’ or seeking to allocate blame for the nation’s departure from integrationist principles.”). 
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on integration,8 and the Obama Administration’s record on integration has 
been mixed.9  Conservatives recently have urged the repeal of laws that 
provide funding to integrate public schools and have provided significant 
financial support to elect school board members who oppose integration.10  
At the same time, some progressives and those who would otherwise 
consider themselves on the “left” criticize integration as insufficiently 
attentive to economic equality and dismissive of black identity and 
                                                                                                                          
8 Integration is the public policy solution that dare not speak its name.  See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., 
Separate and Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, at A27 (arguing that while integration is “[o]ne of 
the most powerful tools for improving the educational achievement of black and Hispanic public school 
students . . . . [i]t has become a political no-no”); see also NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY, 
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR SCHOOL INTEGRATION: A STATUS REPORT 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityIssueBriefNo4.pdf (reporting that while “[t]he Secretary 
of Education has expressed strong support for school diversity and reduction of racial isolation in 
speeches . . . . support for school integration is not yet reflected in the requirements and point systems 
of many key [departmental] competitive grant programs, where it might make the most difference”); 
James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 142 (2007) 
(“[I]ntegration has not been seriously pursued in most [public school] districts for over two decades.”); 
Steve Bogira, Separate, Unequal, and Ignored, CHI. READER (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chicago-politics-segregation-african-american-black-white-
hispanic-latino-population-census-community/Content?oid=3221712 (stating that segregation has 
“largely disappeared from the nation’s agenda”). 
9 See Richard Kahlenberg, Does Obama Believe in School Integration?, TAKING NOTE (Nov. 17, 
2009), http://takingnote.tcf.org/2009/11/does-obama-believe-in-school-integration.html (asserting that 
after ten months in office, the Obama Administration had not shown a significant commitment to 
school integration); When Will the Government Actually Fight “The Battle of Westchester?,” ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION CTR. (May 15, 2012), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-false-claims-
case/when-will-government-actually-fight-battle-westchester (reporting on a recent federal district 
court decision finding Westchester County in breach of a historic consent decree that requires it to end 
residential segregation and existing patterns of racial exclusion throughout the county, and asserting 
that “the federal government is still failing to treat the consent decree as the binding federal court order 
that it is, and has yet to hold Westchester to account for its continuing violations of each and all of its 
consent decree obligations”); see also NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY, supra note 8, at 1 
(stating that the Secretary of Education’s support for diversity in schools has not yet been reflected in 
competitive grant programs).  On the other hand, the Obama Administration has issued important new 
guidance on integration to local school districts.  This new guidance embraces diversity and indicates 
that school districts may use race in student assignment plans in order to promote diversity.  U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Just., Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid 
Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, ED.GOV, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2012). 
10 See Minnesota Senate Republican: Integration ‘Destroyed’ Minneapolis, WASH. INDEP. 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://washingtonindependent.com/107369/minnesota-senate-republican-integration-
%E2%80%98destroyed%E2%80%99-minneapolis (reporting “a move by Minnesota Republicans to 
repeal school integration laws” that “would take funding from integration and desegregation 
programs . . . and shift them to statewide programs for literacy”); see also Jane Mayer, State for Sale, 
NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 90 (reporting that “conservative board members, elected [to the Wake 
County School board] with the support of [a conservative multimillionaire] and Tea Party activists, 
overturned a program that used busing to achieve economic diversity in schools—a program that the 
Washington Post had called ‘one of the nation’s most celebrated integration efforts’”). 
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culture.11 
Given integration’s prominence as the ideological centerpiece of the 
Civil Rights Movement, these crosscutting tensions prompted scholars and 
commentators to explain the disconnect and to assess the possibilities of  
integration as “a political program, moral ideal and social agenda.”12  Some 
scholars have argued that integration holds significant transformative 
potential.13  They assert that integration should be resurrected and again 
occupy the center of any meaningful program for racial and social justice.14  
Other scholars have suggested that because racial integration “is not the 
right answer for most African Americans,”15 that a policy of limited 
separation is preferable.16 
In his recent book, Critical Race Consciousness: Reconsidering 
American Ideologies of Racial Justice, Professor Gary Peller joins this 
robust and ongoing conversation about integration and its role in 
facilitating racial equality.  Peller’s central claim is not that integration has 
had too little influence over the shape of racial equality and social policy, 
but that it has had too much.17  Thus, Peller asserts that in the ideological 
struggle between black nationalists and integrationists over the meaning of 
racial justice, victory should have gone to the nationalists—not the 
integrationists.18  From there, the die was cast.  For Peller, there is no need 
to “reclaim” integration, because the ideology of “integrationism” that 
emerged from this conflict was fatally flawed from the start.19  
Integrationism was conservative, apologetic, and unduly focused on the 
                                                                                                                          
11 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 1 (2010) (“One might have 
expected civil rights activists to press harder for integration.  But by the late 1960s, left political 
movements were shifting priorities from ‘redistribution’ to ‘recognition’—from socioeconomic 
equality to equality of respect and esteem for identities and cultures.”); Foner & Kennedy, supra note 7, 
at 11 (“Many leftists feel that as a political goal, integration fails to address deeply rooted economic 
inequalities.  Many African-Americans criticize it for implying the dismantling of a distinctive black 
culture and identity.”). 
12 Foner & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 11. 
13 See Eric Foner, Editorial, The Great Divide, NATION, Oct. 30, 1995, at 488 (arguing that 
“integration has meant not the absorption of blacks into the pre-existing white social order but the 
transformation of American society so as to give real meaning to the principle of equality”). 
14 See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 1 (“This book aims to resurrect the ideal of integration from 
the grave of the Civil Rights Movement.”); Foner, supra note 13, at 488 (“The time has come to 
reintroduce integration into our political vocabulary . . . .”). 
15 BROOKS, supra note 1, at 104. 
16 See id. at 199 (defining “[l]imited separation” as “any racial or gender classification that 
promotes individual opportunity but that does not unnecessarily subordinate or trammel the interests of 
individuals inside or outside the group”). 
17 See PELLER, supra note 2, at xvi (asserting that the predominance of integrationism in the 
1960s and 1970s ultimately stifled reform and legitimated already existing social practices). 
18 Id. at xii. 
19 Id. at xiv–xv. 
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narrow aim of overcoming prejudice and discrimination.20  The ideology of 
integrationism was inconsistent with meaningful reform.21 
Thus, in Peller’s analysis, the integrationists’ triumph set the stage for 
the marginalization of black nationalism; helped to “legitimate and 
perpetuate the existing racial distribution of power and prestige;”22 
facilitated conservatives’ ability to co-opt and ultimately undermine 
progressive racial reforms;23 undermined the Court’s ability to adopt a de 
facto, rather than de jure, standard for proving violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause; and finally made it more difficult for progressive whites 
and others to critique more recent neo-black nationalist discourse that 
undermines racial equality.24 
One must give Professor Peller credit for intervening in this important 
discussion.  Professor Peller’s project takes black nationalism seriously as 
an ideological and political worldview.  He wants to resuscitate black 
nationalism from the one-dimensional perspective from which it is often 
viewed.25  Consequently, Professor Peller’s intervention is to argue for a 
muscular, nuanced, and sophisticated understanding of black nationalism 
as it posed an ideological alternative to integration.26  Critical Race 
Consciousness is useful because it distills two iconic approaches to 
achieving racial justice and shows how black nationalism provided a thick, 
substantive critique of integration.27  The book succeeds in showing how 
these two philosophies were in continual dialogue during the height of the 
Civil Rights Movement. 
But ultimately, Professor Peller’s argument is not convincing.  Critical 
Race Consciousness woefully underestimates integration and 
mischaracterizes integrationism.  Peller conflates integration with 
“integrationism,” and then defines integrationism as an individualistic, 
race-neutral notion of antidiscrimination.28  Peller defines “integrationism” 
as a set of beliefs that locates “racial oppression in the social structure of 
prejudice and stereotype based on skin color and that identifies progress 
with the transcendence of a racial consciousness about the world.”29  
According to Peller, integrationism was concerned primarily with 
                                                                                                                          
20 See id. at xiv (arguing that since “integrationism” was a conservative movement, it reinforced 
social and institutional norms which perpetuated white dominance rather than bringing about 
meaningful reforms). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at xiv–xv. 
24 Id. at 113. 
25 Id. at xv.  
26 Id. at xii. 
27 See id. at xv (stating that he will analyze black nationalism and integrationism and show that 
they are not bipolar world views). 
28 Id. at 4–5.  
29 Id. at xii. 
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eradicating racial prejudice and advancing individual equal treatment.30  As 
part of its commitment to individual equal treatment, integrationism 
privileged race neutrality, equal opportunity, and the elimination of 
discrimination.31  From Peller’s perspective, integrationism is deeply 
problematic because it converts the complex practice of social 
subordination into a narrow problem of discrimination.32  At the same time, 
integrationism’s focus on equal treatment and the evils of racial 
discrimination made it possible to equate black racism with white racism.33 
What Peller misses is that integration neither was nor should be seen 
simply as an exercise in attempting to reform whites’ prejudicial views.  I 
have argued that integration is actually quite radical because of its laser-
like focus on racial segregation, which “structures, maintains, and 
perpetuates inequality across virtually every indicia of social, political, 
educational and economic wellbeing.”34  Nor is integration necessarily in 
tension with black culture and identity formation.35  Thus, I offered the 
concept of “radical integration,” where the goal of integration is to ensure 
that “previously separate environment[s] actually facilitate instrumental 
equality for the purposes of facilitating black empowerment.”36  Radical 
integration encompasses a strong structural component and takes black 
identity formation within newly integrated environments seriously. 
Properly understood, integration is a tool for undermining established 
power structures.  Integrationists attacked segregation because they 
understood segregation for what it was: a systematic regime structured to 
disenfranchise and disinvest in the black community and dishonor and 
stigmatize individual African Americans.37  Accordingly, much of the 
integrationist approach was an attempt to gain access to white-dominated 
resources.  The integrationist approach, like the nationalist approach, was 
oriented toward redressing a power imbalance.38  Neither approach was 
perfect, but it goes too far to assume that if nationalism had achieved 
                                                                                                                          
30 Id. at 4. 
31 Id. at 4–6. 
32 Id. at 6–7. 
33 See id. at 7 (“[W]ithin the integrationist ideology, a Black person who stereotypes whites is 
racist in the same way as a white person who harbors prejudice against Blacks.  And Blacks who 
discriminate against whites are guilty of the same kind of racism as whites who discriminate against 
Blacks.  Anyone can engage in racism because we can identify racism from a vantage point of race 
neutrality, of not making someone’s race count for anything.  The symmetry of the integrationist 
picture is rooted in the idea that racism consists of possessing a race consciousness about the world, in 
thinking that race should make a difference in social relations.”). 
34 Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 275 (2006). 
35 See id. at 297–311 (arguing that racial identity can be formed in a variety of contexts, not just in 
geographically black communities; that black individuals can construct post segregation identities; and 
that narrow notions of “authentic” black identity are incorrect). 
36 Id. at 274. 
37 PELLER, supra note 2, at 4. 
38 Id. at 7. 
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sustained dominance in the black community, everything, including the 
trajectory of equal protection doctrine after the Brown v. Board of 
Education39 decision, would have been different. 
Critical Race Consciousness is not simply a work of social or political 
history of how black power adherents responded to calls for school 
integration in 1967.  Instead, Critical Race Consciousness makes a 
normative argument about how one should think about integration as a 
goal.40  Peller argues that integration as a goal was flawed from the start 
because it was bound up with a fundamental commitment to race neutrality 
that focused on correcting whites’ cognitive error and universalism.41  
Peller’s claims tap into the view that integration served the narrow interests 
of racially insecure black folk who sought a form of race reform that 
corresponded with white interests.  A common view of integration—which 
Critical Race Consciousness supports and advances—is that integration 
has been accommodationist and lacking in any fundamental structural 
critique of the vast power imbalances between blacks and whites.42  In this 
Book Review, I reclaim integration from Peller’s integrationism and show 
how integration has important structural roots and potential for achieving 
racial justice.  The review is organized in two parts. 
In Part II, I describe Professor Peller’s definition of “integrationism,” 
his critique of integrationism, and his vision of modern black nationalism.  
In Peller’s view, integrationism triumphantly emerged from the ideological 
confrontation between integrationists and black nationalists in the 1960s 
and 1970s.43  For Peller, the wrong ideology triumphed because 
integrationism mistakes the practice of social domination for discrete 
instances of cognitive irrationality.44  At the same time, integrationism 
rejects race consciousness.45  Thus, integrationism could never provide a 
sustained critique of (or a serious solution for) the massive power 
imbalance between blacks and whites.  Peller asserts that, on the other 
hand, modern black nationalism was poised to “revitalize and transform 
the struggle against racial oppression.”46  But black nationalism’s potential 
                                                                                                                          
39 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
40 Cf. PELLER, supra note 2, at xi–xii (critiquing the fact that integrationist ideology has played a 
limiting role in race reform over the last several decades). 
41 See id. at 8 (arguing that this movement has become “the struggle against ‘race,’ thus 
appear[ing] natural and inevitable . . . and simply another part of the teleological progression toward 
the liberation of social life”). 
42 See id. at 3 (describing integrationism as a social resistance movement of hundreds of 
thousands of people from different cities who, under the same banner, employed mass protests, 
economic boycotts, civil disobedience, sit-ins, and strikes). 
43 Id. at xii. 
44 Id. at 6–7. 
45 See id. at 4 (explaining the ideal was to “transcend stereotypes in favor of treating people as 
individuals, free from racial-group identification”). 
46 Id. at xiv. 
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was never realized because a coalition of liberal whites and black 
moderates joined forces to “equate Black nationalists with white 
supremacists,” bringing forth the consensus view of black nationalism.47   
In Part III, I present my critique.  I argue that Professor Peller has 
improperly converted integration into “integrationism,” which he 
associates with an individualistic, race-neutral notion of antidiscrimination.  
I contest Peller’s definition of integrationism then and now, and I explain 
why his bending of integration to race neutrality is problematic.  As I 
explain in Part III.A, integration, when properly understood, has radical 
transformative potential.  In this Part, I show how prominent proponents of 
integration, as well as many of the architects of the litigation that 
culminated in Brown v. Board of Education, asserted a structural view of 
integration.  They attacked segregation and favored integration because 
they believed it was the best way to secure equal opportunity and full 
citizenship for all black people.48  Legal and social science research and 
literature support the view that segregation is an exceedingly powerful 
form of exclusion, which facilitates systematic disinvestment and retreat 
from black communities and resource hoarding in white communities.  
Because of integration’s “laser-like” focus on the harms associated with 
racial segregation, it is incorrect to characterize integration as being 
premised primarily on race neutrality and little else, as Critical Race 
Consciousness suggests.49 
In Part III.A, I argue that Professor Peller’s view is problematic for 
another reason: it mischaracterizes the extent to which integration has been 
accepted as a goal by Americans.  Peller accurately observes that our 
reigning racial ideology is the commitment to individualistic race-
neutrality in the provision of governmental services and functions, in 
public accommodations, and in some areas of private life.  This is a huge 
advance over a de jure regime, but it is not integration.  Peller defines 
integration as integrationism and then conflates integrationism with our 
society’s commitment to individualistic race-neutrality.50  The better 
definition of integration is as a set of beliefs that recognizes the limitations 
of our society’s equality norm (a commitment to enforcing race-neutral, 
antidiscrimination in governmental decision-making), but presses for the 
fullest possible enforcement of that norm notwithstanding its inherent 
limitations.  From this perspective, integrationists’ demands are clearly 
structural.  Integrationists insist that our race-neutral antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                          
47 Id.  
48 PELLER, supra note 2, at 5. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 4. 
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regime breaks down “barriers to entry” to formerly closed white spaces.51 
In Part III.B, I argue that Professor Peller’s capture of integration as 
having footing solely in individualistic race neutrality is also problematic 
because it mischaracterizes the extent to which integration, as 
distinguished from an ideology of individualistic race-neutrality, has led to 
current views of equal protection law.  On Peller’s account, 
integrationism’s rejection of race consciousness and its embrace of race 
neutrality and colorblindness facilitated the Court’s narrow interpretation 
of the Equal Protection Clause and its disdain for affirmative action.52  I 
reach a different conclusion.  I explore Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado53 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District54 and conclude that the equal protection doctrine is 
malleable.  The trajectory of the equal protection doctrine since the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education has had more to do with the 
complex interaction of social movements, electoral results, court 
appointments, and white backlash than with integrationists’ ideological 
“capture” of racial discourse. 
II.  CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE CRITIQUE 
A.  Integrationism:  Definition and Critique 
In Radical Integration, I argued against narrowly dichotomizing 
integration on the one hand and black identity and culture on the other.55  
In Critical Race Consciousness, Professor Peller takes a different 
approach.  For Peller, “integrationism” “locates racial oppression in the 
social structure of prejudice and stereotype based on skin color 
and . . . identifies progress with the transcendence of racial consciousness 
about the world.”56  In Peller’s view, integrationism, essentially a discourse 
or set of beliefs about racial relationships, is the ideology that triumphantly 
emerged from the ideological confrontation between integrationists and 
black nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s.57  For Peller, that triumph 
carried a high price: “[T]he dominant conception of racial justice 
[integrationism] was framed to require that Black nationalism be equated 
with white supremacy and that race consciousness on the part of either 
whites or Blacks by marginalized as beyond the good sense of 
                                                                                                                          
51 See id. at xii (explaining the structural aspects of integrationism and how it seeks to forge race-
neutrality). 
52 See infra Part II.B (describing Peller’s view of black nationalism). 
53 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
54 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
55 See Adams, supra note 34, at 267, 302 (asserting that there is a false dichotomy between 
integration and black identity formation). 
56 PELLER, supra note 2, at xii. 
57 Id. 
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‘enlightened’ American culture.”58 
In order to understand Peller’s vision of integrationism, it is important 
to focus on Peller’s description of the structure of integrationist ideology.  
The integrationist ideology forms the analytic components of 
integrationism.59  As Peller describes the integrationist ideology, or vision, 
racial inequality is caused by irrational thinking or prejudice, which leads 
whites to believe in white supremacy and take harmful actions toward 
blacks based upon those beliefs.60  For Peller’s integrationists then, the 
individual, rather than the group, is the baseline unit of measurement.61  
Skin color is simply a phenotype, nothing more.  Consequently, whites’ 
discriminatory actions toward blacks are the actual manifestations of a 
flawed cognitive process.62   
At the core of Peller’s integrationism is the problem of discrimination, 
“the disparate treatment of whites and Blacks that the irrational attribution 
of difference is supposed to justify.”63  Thus, integrationists see racism as a 
deviation from neutrality.64  They imagine the ideal of a race-neutral world 
where discrimination on the basis of race no longer occurs because 
irrational prejudice has been rooted out.65  Thus, the integrationist wants to 
get beyond race, transcend it, and achieve a world where individuals are 
seen as individuals, not as numbers of racially defined groups.66  
Universalism, objectivity, rationalism, and a commitment to liberalism in 
the classical sense are all sacrosanct.67 
Peller’s integrationists are committed to a narrative of progress, where 
once “we remove prejudice, reason will take its place; once we remove 
discrimination, neutrality will take its place; once we remove segregation, 
integration will take its place.”68  Obviously, segregation is inconsistent 
with the integrationist worldview.  Indeed, segregation and the Jim Crow 
regime are perhaps the ultimate manifestation of whites’ distorted mental 
process.  From Peller’s perspective, the integrationists’ problem with 
segregation is not fundamentally structural.  Instead, to the integrationist, 
segregation is a manifestation of the “distortion of reason through the 
                                                                                                                          
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 Id. at 4.   
61 Id. at 4–5.  
62 See id. (discussing how, under the integationist ideology, racism is manifested in the social 
context when the consciousness distorts prejudice and that is translated into practice).  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 6. 
65 Id. at 4–5.  
66 Id. at 5–6.  
67 See id. at 6–8 (discussing the integrationist view as one that connects a commitment to 
universalism, objectivity, rationalism, and a liberal society). 
68 Id. at 6. 
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prism of myth and ignorance.”69 
According to Peller, the central problem with integrationist ideology is 
that it fundamentally misdiagnoses the nature of racism and racial 
inequality.  First, integrationism, as Peller understands it, mistakes the 
practice of social domination for discrete instances of cognitive 
irrationality.70  In other words, integrationism mistakes power for 
irrationality.  Second, integrationism views all forms of race consciousness 
as equally pernicious.71  Thus, from the integrationist perspective, “a Black 
person who stereotypes whites is racist in the same way as a white person 
who harbors prejudice against Blacks.”72  That is, integrationist ideology 
rejected all forms of race consciousness, including calls by blacks for 
“black power” during the 1960s. 
Peller argues that integrationists rejected “Black Power” because of a 
fundamental disagreement about the nature of racial inequality.73  First, as 
discussed above, because integrationists were ideologically committed to 
race neutrality and ending racial segregation, they rejected the race-
conscious nature of calls for “Black Power.”74  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, integrationists rejected black power because of a fundamental 
disagreement about the nature of white supremacy and how racial equality 
could be achieved.  Peller argues that the “Black Power concept troubled 
integrationists because it assumed that power determined the distribution 
of social resources and opportunities, rather than reason or merit.”75  Thus, 
the integrationists’ commitment to universalism made it impossible to 
accept a black power philosophy.  Integrationists and black power 
advocates did not just disagree about strategy; they possessed wholly 
different worldviews.76 
Thus, in Peller’s view, integrationism’s focus on prejudice, 
discrimination, rationality, and liberal individualism meant it could never 
provide a sustained critique of (or a serious solution for) the massive power 
imbalance between blacks and whites.  For Peller, integrationism was 
“accommodationist and conservative.”77  It was inherently conservative 
since it did not demand a “radical transformation of social practices.”78  In 
                                                                                                                          
69 Id. at 4. 
70 Id. at 6–7. 
71 Id. at 6. 
72 Id. at 7. 
73 Id. at 22. 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 See id. (“Through the ideological filters of integrationism, Black nationalism and white 
supremacy appear essentially the same because both are rooted in race consciousness. . . . 
Integrationists saw nationalists as regressive because, in the integrationist view, progress meant 
transcending race as a basis of social decision-making.”). 
77 Id. at 59. 
78 Id. at 10. 
 2013] INTEGRATION RECLAIMED 739 
Peller’s view, integrationist practice is also too limited because it seeks 
only a “change in the rules of social decision-making.”79 
B.  Peller’s Vision of Modern Black Nationalism 
Peller views black nationalism through the lens of integration during 
the 1960s and early 1970s.80  For Peller, this period was both black 
nationalism’s heyday and its dénouement.  It was in this period that Peller 
argues: 
Black nationalism had its most complete and sophisticated 
theoretical development, as well as its greatest mass 
appeal, . . . when it was articulated as an alternative world 
view to integrationism and as part of a program of radical 
social transformation by Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, 
Kwame Ture, Amiri Baraka, Harold Cruse, the Black 
Panthers, [and others.]81 
Peller describes the modern black nationalist approach as focusing on 
black subordination and “the hierarchy of the white community over the 
black community.”82  For black nationalists, race, rather than the 
individual, is the meta-organizing principle.83  Thus, the starting point for 
black nationalists was the assertion that black Americans occupy a distinct 
social community.84  According to the black nationalist view, blacks are a 
nation within a nation that is subjected to a form of colonial domination 
within their own country.85  From this perspective, racial equality can be 
achieved only by strengthening the core components of the black nation: 
black churches, black schools, black businesses, black families, and black 
neighborhoods.86 
As Peller describes it, modern black nationalism as an ideology had 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 20.  I use the term “modern black nationalism” to mean black nationalism during the 
1960s and 1970s and to distinguish it from earlier incarnations of black nationalism.  Peller also 
discusses the term “Black Power” as it relates to the development of modern black nationalism.  Id. at 
20–22.  I use the term modern black nationalism to be inclusive of the phrase “black power.”  See id. at 
22 (declining to define the meaning of “black power” but stating that it “is clear that, for most, the 
‘Black Power’ slogan represented the beginning of repudiation of integrationist/civil rights ideology in 
favor of some form of nationalism”). 
81 Id. at 20. 
82 Id. at 37. 
83 See id. at 24 (“In contrast to the integrationist premise that Blacks and whites are essentially the 
same, the idea of race as the organizing basis for group consciousness asserts that Blacks and whites 
are different, in the sense of coming from different communities, neighborhoods, churches, families, 
histories, and of being in various ways foreigners to each other.”). 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 24–25. 
86 See id. at 37 (“[N]ationalists sought to strengthen and develop the institutions in the Black 
community that would serve African Americans.”). 
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achieved a level of sophistication and maturity that distinguished it from 
prior iterations of nationalist belief within the black community.87  The 
core components of modern black nationalism during this period were 
invocation of a colonialism model to describe race relations, rejection of 
accommodation with the white power structure, and a recognition that the 
black community’s future laid within the geographical borders of the 
United States as opposed to outside of them.88  Consequently, Peller makes 
the following claim: modern black nationalists, led by Malcolm X, could 
for the first time provide an essential critique that “combined militant 
engagement with the white power structure with the racial solidarity and 
anti-assimilationism traditionally associated with nationalism.”89 
Thus, for Peller, modern black nationalism was poised to provide a 
thoroughgoing and muscular critique of white hegemony.  Moreover, 
according to Peller, by the late 1960s, the modern black nationalists were 
winning: “[A]fter decades of marginality within the African-American 
community, Black nationalism achieved mass appeal and arguably 
overtook integrationism as the dominant ideology of racial liberation.”90  
But in Peller’s view, modern black nationalism’s potential was never 
realized because a coalition of liberal whites and black moderates joined 
forces to “equate Black nationalists and white supremacists” and the 
consensus view of black nationalism was born.91   
This struggle was not just ideological.  Peller asserts that 
integrationists rejected nationalism because of the threat that it posed “to 
the cultural self-identity of both the Black, middle-class moderates and 
white, liberal supporters of civil rights.”92  Faced with the conflict between 
an ideological and political commitment to integration on the one hand and 
allegations of racial betrayal on the other, Peller asserts that the black 
middle class solution was to de-racialize white space.93  Consequently, 
black integrationists emphasized that the newly open institutions, spaces, 
and places were race neutral, rather than subject to white racial 
domination.94  Thus, for Peller, integrationists’ commitment to rationality, 
individualism, and race neutrality was not just ideological; it also signaled 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 58. 
88 Id. at 58–59. 
89 Id. at 59. 
90 Id. at 54. 
91 Id. at xiv. 
92 Id. at 53. 
93 See id. at 61 (“In the nationalist analysis, the very success of the Black middle class . . . 
betrayed the aspirations of the Black community because it reflected gains granted by a white power 
structure in exchange for Black administration of white interests.”). 
94 See id. (“Integrationism, in the particular, universalist form it took in the 1960s, responded to 
this anxiety by denying that the world to which the Black middle class aspired was racially identifiable 
as a particularly white world, rather than a realm of universal, culturally neutral social practices.”). 
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a deep-seated anxiety about racial self-identity.95 
Peller asserts that black integrationists feared race consciousness 
because of insecurity about their racial self-identity.  The black 
nationalists’ charges hit home for black integrationists who “worried [that] 
they were assimilating to a white world” and that their presence in white 
institutions accommodated rather than frustrated white interests.96  Thus, 
black integrationists experienced racial anxiety.  White integrationists 
feared race consciousness because of insecurity about their own culture 
and a deep-seated need to suppress any hint of white supremacist 
ideology.97  For Peller, these twin anxieties had devastating consequences.  
Integrationists “closed ranks” in rejecting black nationalism specifically 
and race consciousness more generally.  The result was that the 
“dominance of this integrationist ideology helped establish the particular 
and narrow manner in which racial power would be understood, and 
thereby helped to legitimate and perpetuate the existing racial distribution 
of power and prestige, even as it recommended marginal reform.”98 
Thus, for Peller, integrationists and modern black nationalists were 
working at cross purposes, with integrationists emphasizing the importance 
of race neutrality while black nationalists stressed the importance of race 
consciousness.  What makes this so problematic from Peller’s perspective 
is that this debate was not simply an intra-group ideological squabble.  
Instead, Peller sees integrationism as driving black nationalism from 
appropriate public discourse.99  Indeed, Peller asserts the integrationists’ 
rejection of black nationalism delegitimized black race consciousness for 
all time by equating it with white supremacy.  Thus for Peller: 
Through the ideological filters of integrationism, Black 
nationalism and white supremacy appear essentially the same 
because both are  rooted in race consciousness, in the idea 
that race matters to one’s  perception and  experience of the 
world.  Integrationists saw nationalists as regressive because, 
in the integrationist view, progress meant transcending race 
as a basis of social decision-making, and in the long term, 
replacing power with reason as the basis for the distribution 
                                                                                                                          
95 See id. at 62 (“Black integrationists gravitated toward a particularly universalist interpretation 
of racial justice to help resolve anxiety that nationalists raised about their self-identity.”). 
96 Id. at 53, 61–62. 
97 See id. at 66–67 (“Black nationalism, particularly in the machismo and Africanist forms it took 
in the late 1960s, specifically exposed the deepest inner anxieties whites as a cultural group 
possessed—anxieties that white liberals and progressives have worked hard to repress.”). 
98 Id. at xiv. 
99 See id. at 52 (“We should understand the dominance of integrationism as at least in part an 
effect, as well as a cause, of the marginalization of nationalism—as a discourse created to justify the 
rejection of nationalism, as well as a discourse that simultaneously informed the way nationalism was 
perceived.”). 
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of resources.  With the centering of integration as the 
mainstream ideology of American good sense, nationalism 
became marginalized as an extremist and backward 
worldview, the irrational correlate in the Black community to 
the never-say-die segregationists of the white community.100 
In summary, Peller’s argument combines a sustained critique of 
integration, while juxtaposing and dichotomizing “conservative” 
integration against modern “radical” black nationalism.  Integrationists 
sought access to white dominated institutions.  Integrationists actively 
formed coalitions with progressive whites to eradicate segregation, which 
necessarily domesticated integration’s racial reform project.  
Integrationists’ essential unit of measurement was the individual rather 
than the community.  While the integrationists spoke for the black middle 
classes and the black elite, the nationalists spoke for the masses.  
Eradicating racial discrimination, as opposed to developing the 
community, was the sine qua non of the integrationist project.  
Integrationists spoke in terms of race neutrality instead of race 
consciousness.  The integration approach was grounded not just in 
ideological commitments or pragmatism, but in deep-seated anxieties 
about racial identity.  For Peller, given this provenance, integration could 
neither have ended American apartheid nor meaningfully transformed 
racial relationships in American society.  Perhaps most importantly, as I 
discussed in Part II.B, Peller argues that the success of integrationism 
meant equal protection law would ultimately be ineffective. 
III.  INTEGRATION RECLAIMED 
A.  Integration as a Radical Approach to Racial Inequality 
Professor Peller’s view of integrationism as having footing solely in 
individualistic race neutrality is problematic because it misses the 
structural dimensions of integration.  Instead, integration was a strategy for 
structurally undermining and ultimately defeating white supremacy.  
Elsewhere, I have described the concept of “radical” integration which 
builds on this understanding.101  Racial integration focuses on the 
importance of desegregation in order to foster blacks’ resource acquisition, 
but only under conditions which foster associational equality.102  Thus, 
radical integration has both a structural aspect (facilitating access to 
resources) and an identity or cultural aspect (promoting the assumption that 
                                                                                                                          
100 Id. at 22–23. 
101 Adams, supra note 34, at 275. 
102 Id. at 272.   
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black individuals can form meaningful identities in multiracial spaces).103  
The concept of radical integration draws on the work of Dr. King and other 
Civil Rights era activists.104 
At the height of the Civil Rights Movement, prominent integrationists 
believed that integration and the coalition building with progressive whites 
that came with it was the best way to eradicate white supremacy and 
improve the educational, economic, and social opportunities, not just for 
middle-class blacks, but for all blacks.  Take, for instance, Bayard Rustin’s 
thoughtful response to the rise of the black power movement.  Rustin was 
one of the key architects of the Civil Rights Movement and an avowed 
integrationist.105  Writing in 1966, Rustin rejected black power because he 
believed black power “diverts the movement from a meaningful debate 
over strategy and tactics, . . . it isolates the Negro community, and it 
encourages the growth of anti-Negro forces.”106  Rustin saw the rise of 
black power as an understandable, if misguided, response to the harms 
associated with white supremacy.107  Indeed, Rustin explicitly rejected any 
“equivalence” between black power and white racism.  In his view, it was 
“both absurd and immoral to equate the despairing response of the victim 
with the contemptuous assertion of the oppressor.”108  Contrary to Peller’s 
suggestion, integrationists like Rustin did not view all forms of race 
consciousness as equally pernicious. 
For Rustin, black power was born out of frustration with the pace of 
change and a growing sense of nihilism in the black community.109  Rustin 
argued that black power was utopian “for the by now obvious reason that 
one-tenth of the population cannot accomplish much by itself.”110  Black 
power was reactionary because it “would give priority to the issue of race 
precisely at a time when the fundamental questions facing the Negro and 
American society alike [were] economic and social.”111  Thus, Rustin 
rejected the idea of black power because it lacked a structural component; 
black power traded in the rhetoric of race but it lacked a realistic program 
for achieving racial equality.112  Consequently, Rustin debated black power 
                                                                                                                          
103 Id. at 275–76. 
104 Id. at 273–76. 
105 See JOHN D’EMILIO, LOST PROPHET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BAYARD RUSTIN 1 (2003) 
(describing Rustin as a visionary and as one of the most important figures in the Civil Rights 
Movement). 
106 See Bayard Rustin, “Black Power” and Coalition Politics, 42 COMMENTARY 35, 35 (1966), 
available at http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/black-power-and-coalition-politics#. 
107 Id. at 39.  Professor Peller cites to Rustin twice in footnotes, but does not provide any 
sustained treatment of his work.  PELLER, supra note 2, at 158 n.9, 170 n.29. 
108 Rustin, supra note 106, at 39. 
109 Id. at 1. 
110 Id. at 2. 
111 Id. at 36. 
112 Id. at 35. 
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adherents on which approach would most likely yield political power, 
increase economic power, reduce black unemployment, raise wages, and 
improve housing conditions for blacks.113  Rustin argued for a “liberal-
labor-civil rights coalition which would work to make the Democratic 
Party truly responsive to the aspirations of the poor, and which would 
develop support [for such programs].”114  This integration approach was 
confined neither to a narrow critique of whites’ cognitive processes nor a 
single-minded focus on discrimination. 
To be sure, integrationists sought an end to prejudice and 
discrimination.  But when we look at the movement for school 
desegregation we see a much more muscular vision of integration than the 
characterization in Critical Race Consciousness allows.  For instance, 
Peller points to the conflict between integrationists and modern black 
nationalists over public school integration as a key example of the 
distinction between the two worldviews.115  Peller describes why modern 
black nationalists thought public school integration undesirable.  First, 
modern black nationalists such as Malcolm X, Kwame Ture, and Charles 
Hamilton argued that public school integration undermined the black 
community’s control of public schools, which meant a loss of social power 
and the ability of the black community to shape black children’s 
education.116  Second, modern black nationalists asserted that public school 
integration necessarily entailed cultural assimilation, which undermined 
the integrity of black culture more generally.117 
As Peller describes it, the conflict over public school integration 
exemplified the difference between integrationism and black nationalism; 
the integrationists focused on eradication of segregation, and the 
nationalists focused on resource redistribution.118  According to Peller, 
because “integrationists had no conceptual category with which to 
comprehend African Americans as a separate national group, they largely 
ignored the possibility of understanding racial justice in terms of transfer 
of resources and power to the Black community as an entity.”119 
But integration and integrationism are different.  Real integration, as 
opposed to integrationism, calls for structural rather than cultural 
assimilation.120  Real integration seeks to allow black individuals to have 
access to significant resources: “Integration values equal access to 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. at 35–36. 
114 Id. 
115 PELLER, supra note 2, at 27. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 23. 
119 Id. at 28. 
120 john powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 337, 353 (1996). 
 2013] INTEGRATION RECLAIMED 745 
educational [and other social and economic] opportunity not 
‘whiteness.’”121  Real integration requires “transformations of institutions, 
communities and individuals.”122  Real integration “involves fundamental 
change, among whites and Blacks, as people and communities.”123  Real 
integration is radical in that it demands desegregation under conditions of 
true equality.124 
Indeed, the architects of the litigation strategy that culminated in 
Brown v. Board of Education did not pursue desegregation because of 
some abstract commitment to universalism or “‘neutral’ social 
practices.”125  Instead, they pursued that strategy because they thought it 
was the best way to secure equal educational opportunity and full 
citizenship for black children under conditions of grotesque inequality.126  
It is easy to forget that the architects of the school desegregation litigation 
tried a black “nation-building” approach before moving on to confronting 
de jure school segregation directly.127  Those architects litigated the 
“equal” portion of the “separate but equal” equation as it pertained to the 
enormous discrepancies in school funding for black versus white schools in 
the South.128  But the effort to equalize school funding in state-mandated 
racially separate schools failed.129 
Those architects then moved to a direct attack on state-mandated 
segregation in the public schools.130  For those architects and many others, 
                                                                                                                          
121 Id. at 354. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Adams, supra note 34, at 272–76. 
125 PELLER, supra note 2, at 29. 
126 See Robert L. Carter, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 1083, 1095 (1988) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987)) (asserting that the NAACP’s “real agenda” in its 
litigation strategy attacking school segregation “was the removal of the basic barrier to full and equal 
citizenship rights for blacks in this country”). 
127 See PELLER, supra note 2, at 26–31 (exploring the competing interests of nationalists and 
integrationists in school desegregation).  
128 JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE 
STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 27 (2010). 
129 See id. (“More often than not, however, school officials would make a token gesture to 
improve education facilities in an attempt to paper over a system that was fundamentally unequal.  This 
included, at times, constructing hastily built, flimsy facilities that some blacks derided as ‘Supreme 
Court schools.’”); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for 
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1526 (2005) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004)) 
(asserting that an equalization strategy failed “because of costly data collecting and plaintiff buy-offs, 
leaving minority and white schools still severely unequal and compelling NAACP lawyers to abandon 
such strategy in part because of costs and in part because they recognized that Whites would only 
protect the school system if they were in it” (footnote omitted)). 
130 See RYAN, supra note 128, at 28 (“Lawyers challenging segregation became more aggressive 
toward the end of the 1940s, a product of their disappointment over equalization suits and their hope 
that the country might be ready for a more direct challenge to Plessy.”). 
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the purpose of that attack was to obtain better educational opportunities for 
black students.131  Consequently, the strategy underpinning the school 
desegregation litigation reflected an effort to tie or link the fates of blacks 
and whites, so that whites could not ignore the educational needs of black 
students.  It was a response to the social and political domination of blacks 
by whites.  As James Ryan describes it, this black-white “tying strategy” 
was primarily structural in nature: 
The best and perhaps only way for blacks to receive an 
education equal to whites was to attend the same schools.  
That way, white-dominated legislatures and school officials 
could not benefit white students without also benefiting black 
ones, or harm black students without also harming whites.  
Desegregation, from this perspective, was not so much an 
end in itself as a means to an end.  It was a tying strategy, 
essentially, where black students would tie their fates to 
white students because, as the saying went, green follows 
white.132 
If the architects of the school desegregation litigation erred, it was in 
underestimating “how effective white power could be in preventing full 
implementation” of the Brown mandate.133  At least one of the major 
architects of the school desegregation litigation believed that the basic 
barrier to blacks’ full equality in American society was racial 
segregation.134  As it turned out, of course, the core barrier to blacks’ full 
equality was white supremacy in all of its manifestations.135 
But the idea that eradicating state-mandated racial segregation could 
lead to full citizenship for blacks was not far-fetched.  Racial segregation 
and white supremacy are inextricably linked.  As John W. Cell explained 
                                                                                                                          
131 See Robert L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward into 
the Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 617 (1979) (asserting that the rationale for the Brown 
strategy was to obtain equal education); see also RYAN, supra note 128, at 28 (“As long as blacks were 
in separate schools, many believed, they would always be shortchanged.  Separate was never going to 
be equal, and the equalization suits tended to confirm this impression.”); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI 
LEE, HARV. UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND 
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 8 (2005), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/why-segregation-matters-poverty-and-educational-
inequality/?searchterm=%22why%20segregation%20matters%22 (“The civil rights movement was 
never about sitting next to whites, it was about equalizing opportunity.”).  
132 RYAN, supra note 128, at 28; see also Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About 
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1570 (2004) (“The NAACP pushed for integration 
because it sought to force white-controlled state and local governments to provide a quality education 
and equal educational opportunity to black schoolchildren.”). 
133 Carter, supra note 126, at 1095. 
134 Id. 
135 See id. (“[N]or did [the lawyers] realize at the time that the basic barrier to full equality for 
blacks was not racial segregation, a symptom, but white supremacy, the disease.”). 
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in his seminal work on the origins of segregation in the United States and 
in South Africa, segregation was more than just a set of laws requiring the 
separation of the races.136  Instead, segregation was “a conscious policy, a 
process (by definition never completed), a system, and an ideology.”137  
Segregation in the American South was “the highest stage[] in the 
evolution of white supremacy.”138  The integrationists may have been 
overly optimistic about their ability to achieve desegregation, but they had 
a structural diagnosis of the problem.  They understood that state-mandated 
segregation rationalized and legitimated a caste system, which 
simultaneously demeaned and disenfranchised blacks while facilitating the 
ability of whites to monopolize political, social, and economic power.139 
Indeed, voluminous legal and social science scholarship provides a 
sophisticated explanation of the harms associated with segregation.140  
Scholars provide a structural account of how segregation assists dominant 
                                                                                                                          
136 See JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF 
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persist to this day); David Card & Jesse Rothstein, Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score 
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effects on black relative achievement.”); David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or 
Bad?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 827, 828 (1997) (“Using a variety of economic and social outcomes, we find 
strong, consistent evidence that black outcomes are substantially worse (both in absolute terms and 
relative to whites) in racially segregated cities than they are in more integrated cities.”); Douglas S. 
Massey & Mary J. Fischer, The Effect of Childhood Segregation on Minority Academic Performance at 
Selective Colleges, 29 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1, 20 (2006) (“[B]lack and Latino students who grew 
up under conditions of segregation were less prepared academically than those coming from majority-
dominant settings.”); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 191 
(2006) (“[S]chool and classroom racial composition have direct effects on SAT test performance.”).  
See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing the importance of race in American society and 
the persistence of residential segregation); GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: 
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996) (outlining the events following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown); SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA (James H. Carr 
& Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008) (demonstrating how discrimination continues to produce residential 
segregation, which affects access to good jobs, education, home ownership, and asset accumulation). 
 748 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:725 
groups and systematically disadvantages others.141  This literature 
articulates a vision of integration that does, in fact, seek to radically 
transform social practices.142  From this perspective, the appropriate frame 
for understanding racial inequality is inclusion and exclusion, rather than 
race consciousness per se.  Segregation is a very powerful form of 
exclusion that allows the dominant group to hoard valuable social, 
economic, and political resources while systematically disinvesting and 
disassociating from the non-dominant group.  On this view, integration 
calls for inclusion into white-dominated space in order to gain access to the 
valuable assets associated with that group.143  Consequently, this view of 
integration is race conscious in that it has a structural critique of the power 
relationships of racially-defined groups. 
For instance, Douglas Massey explains how spatial boundaries such as 
residential segregation, whether de jure or de facto, enhance the social 
process of stratification.144  According to Massey, stratification is the social 
process wherein: 
[I]ndividuals form categorical mental representations of in-
groups and out-groups through framing; translate these 
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credit, not just in the conscious animus of individuals, but deeply embedded in our institutional 
practices as well as our unconscious attitudes.”). 
142 See, e.g., Roslyn Arlin Mickelson & Martha Bottia, Integrated Education and Mathematics 
Outcomes: A Synthesis of Social Science Research, 88 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1042–43 (2010) (finding that 
“for the vast majority of mathematics learners, integrated schools could be added to the list of ‘what 
works’” in education); Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the 
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 376 (2012) (articulating “a constitutional 
right to equal access to middle-income peers that operates most directly at the school district level”); 
Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 603 (2011) 
(explaining the benefits of racial diversity to white parents and arguing that “[w]hite children’s future 
careers and earnings hinge on educating them in diverse classrooms today”). 
143 See Douglas S. Massey, Why Housing Segregation Still Matters, 3 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 97, 
107 (2006) (linking residential integration with access to social resources).  As Massey argues: 
[T]he residential integration of most ethnic groups has been achieved as a by-
product of broader processes of socioeconomic attainment, not because group 
members sought to live among native whites per se.  The desire for integration is 
only one of a larger set of motivations, and not necessarily the most important.  
Some minorities may even be antagonistic to the idea of integration, but for spatial 
assimilation to occur, they need only to be willing to put up with integration in order 
to gain access to socioeconomic resources that are more abundant in areas where 
white families predominate. 
Id. 
144 MASSEY, supra note 141, at 18–19. 
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representations into social categories through boundary work; 
and then establish institutional structures for exploitation and 
opportunity hoarding that correspond to categorical 
boundaries, thereby generating unequal access to resources 
such as financial capital, human capital, social capital, and 
cultural capital.145  
The stratification process structures the power relationships between in-
group and out-group members.  And indeed, race is a form of social 
stratification.146  Stratification is most salient when social, cultural, 
economic, and spatial boundaries are consolidated.147  Conversely, when 
in-groups and out-groups are spatially integrated, stratification and 
strategic disinvestment become more difficult.148 
But beyond recognizing how segregation facilitates stratification, 
integrationists have also recognized how whiteness itself is a tool of 
exclusion.  As john powell and Caitlin Watt have explained, the concept of 
whiteness has morphed and shape-shifted since the fall of Jim Crow.149  
They argue that the concept of whiteness now signifies “a system of 
privilege and exclusion related to non-whites.”150  That is, whiteness is not 
a phenotype, but rather is “functionally defined . . . as the right to exclude 
and dominate others.”151  Watt and powell do not ascribe bad acts or anti-
black animus to all white people.  Their view is exactly the opposite.  It is 
that race is inherent within the structure of American social, political, and 
economic arrangements.152  Thus, individual animus is not necessary to 
perpetuate a discriminatory system.153  But systematic exclusion is 
necessary.154  And these imbedded structures create what white and black 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id. at 18. 
146 Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the 
Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2010). 
147 See MASSEY, supra note 141, at 19 (“[W]hen social parameters are consolidated—when social, 
economic, and spatial characteristics correlate strongly with one another—the process of stratification 
become sharper and more acute.”). 
148 Id.  This is why “whenever the powerful have sought to stigmatize and subordinate a particular 
social group, they have endeavored to confine its members to specific neighborhoods by law, edict, or 
practice.”  Id. 
149 See john a. powell & Caitlin Watt, Negotiating the New Racial & Political Environment, 11 
J.L. SOC’Y 31, 38–40 (2009) (“Whiteness has morphed . . . . White is now the inward, private, and 
isolated individual.”). 
150 Id. at 34. 
151 Id. at 45. 
152 Id. at 57. 
153 See id. at 47, 58 (suggesting that while individual animus is a factor, there are other extrinsic 
influences to a discriminatory system). 
154 See id. at 44 (“Whiteness was created as an exclusionary space.”). 
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mean.155  This view of whiteness as exclusion takes us far beyond a static 
colonial contest between the black nation and the white nation.  
Professor Peller’s capture of integration as having footing solely in 
individualistic race-neutrality is problematic for yet another reason: it 
mischaracterizes the extent to which integration has been accepted as a 
goal.  As a country, we are committed to individualistic race-neutrality in 
the provision of governmental services and functions, in public 
accommodations, and in some areas of private life.156  What this means is 
that we have a general societal agreement that the government usually 
should not take account of an individual’s race in making decisions or 
providing services.  This view, which we might also call “race-neutral 
antidiscrimination,” is perfectly captured by Chief Justice Roberts’s 
admonition in Parents Involved: “The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”157  This 
commitment is a huge advance beyond a de jure regime, but it is not 
integration properly understood.  American civil rights law and policy is 
committed to individualistic race-neutrality, not the enforcement of real 
integration.158  Integration, in other words, remains an unreached goal. 
Peller defines integration as integrationism and then conflates 
integrationism with our society’s commitment to individualistic race-
neutrality.159  The better view is that integrationists recognize the 
limitations of our society’s equality norm (a commitment to enforcing 
race-neutral, antidiscrimination in governmental decision-making), but 
press for the fullest possible enforcement of that norm notwithstanding its 
inherent limitations.160  From this perspective, integrationists seek effective 
and full enforcement of the antidiscrimination mandate under conditions of 
                                                                                                                          
155 See id. at 45 (“In our society race has been about exclusion, power and belonging.  It might be 
more accurate to say that is what white has meant in our society.  Whiteness has been functionally 
defined as the right to exclude and dominate others.”). 
156 This is perhaps best exemplified by the striking success of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibits racial and other types of discrimination in privately-owned public 
accommodations.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–g (2006). 
157 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
158 See Stefanie DeLuca, What Is the Role of Housing Policy? Considering Choice and Social 
Science Evidence, 34 J. URB. AFF. 21, 23–24 (2012) (arguing that in the context of federal housing 
policy, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development does not have a mission of 
enhancing housing mobility and racial integration).  Integration is enforced unenthusiastically, if at all, 
and in an uncoordinated and piecemeal fashion.  Even in the context of school desegregation, which is 
most closely associated with integration, coordinated, sustained enforcement of the desegregation 
mandate by all three branches of the federal government lasted for only six years (1968–1974).  See 
generally Gary Orfield et al., Deepening Segregation in American Public Schools, 19 S. CHANGES 11, 
13–14 (1997) (discussing the changes to school segregation policies, which are detracting from prior 
integration efforts).  
159 PELLER, supra note 2, at 3–5. 
160 See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Conciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 770–72 (explaining that “the 
integrationist cure for discrimination is equal treatment” and how this view is highly abstract). 
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equality.  On this view, integrationists demand that law and policy break 
up and redistribute some of whites’ “ill gotten gain” by facilitating black 
individuals’ access to whites’ resources.161  From this perspective, 
integrationists demand that our race-neutral, antidiscrimination regime 
break down “barriers to entry”162 to formerly closed white spaces and 
provide members of minority groups access to certain markets, i.e., 
education, marriage, housing, and employment, which had been restricted 
under the previous de jure system.163 
Peller argues that by the late 1960s, black nationalists led by Malcolm 
X had developed a sophisticated approach to white supremacy that 
“combined militant engagement with the white power structure with the 
racial solidarity and anti-assimilationism traditionally associated with 
nationalism.”164  In his view, nationalism’s potential was never reached 
because of a tragic compromise:  
Along with the suppression of white racism . . . the dominant 
conception of racial justice was framed to require that Black 
Nationalism be equated with white supremacy and that race 
consciousness on the part of either whites or blacks be 
marginalized as beyond the good sense of ‘enlightened’ 
American culture.165 
Critical Race Consciousness did not convince me that black 
nationalism was poised to provide either an ideological critique or a 
coherent affirmative program to achieve racial equality that was superior to 
the one advanced by the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement, such as 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Bayard Rustin, and James Farmer, who are most 
closely associated with integration.166  But even granting that black 
nationalism provided a sophisticated critique of white power and 
                                                                                                                          
161 See Adams, supra note 34, at 275–76 (“[E]quality is defined not just as equity with respect to 
facilities and resources under conditions of segregation, but as access to the structures of opportunity 
associated with success and upward mobility.”). 
162 In antitrust law, a barrier to entry is defined as “some factor in a market that permits firms 
already in the market to earn monopoly profits, while deterring outsiders from coming in.”  HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 
1999). 
163 See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1117–21 (2002) (exploring racial discrimination as a “barrier to entry”). 
164 PELLER, supra note 2, at 59. 
165 Id. at xii. 
166 Professor Peller’s revisionist attempt to separate Dr. King from integration only demonstrates 
that Peller’s vision of “integrationism” is too impoverished to include him.  See id. at 43–45 (“King has 
become more of an ‘integrationist’ in death, however, than he was in life.”)  If King was not an 
integrationist, then no one was.  See Randall Kennedy, Imagining Malcolm X, AM. PROSPECT (June 9, 
2011), http://prospect.org/article/imagining-malcolm-x (asserting that Malcolm X did not have a 
coherent program for achieving racial equality and that “during black America’s most rousing 
decade . . . Malcolm X allowed himself to be largely confined to the sidelines”). 
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domination, it was never going to achieve ideological dominance in a more 
open society.  One of the reasons that the nationalist approach failed was 
because it was premised on a vision of racial solidarity that could not be 
sustained once de jure segregation was prohibited.  The nationalist 
approach was too static to deal with the mobility that a race-neutral, 
antidiscrimination regime represented and the fluidity that a multiracial 
society promised. 
A race-neutral, antidiscrimination regime tends to increase racial 
fragmentation and undermine racial solidarity.167  Ironically, racial 
fragmentation is a sign of the success of our civil rights laws.  Where 
access is more open we would expect to see more racial fragmentation and 
less racial solidarity.168  Today, there is even more fragmentation in the 
black community.169  Commentators have suggested that there are at least 
two, and as many as four, discrete black “communities.”170  These 
communities are not just geographically separate, but experience racism 
that is “different in kind—not just in degree—from the racism that plagued 
the underclass.”171  Not only do these disparate black communities 
experience racial discrimination differently, their interests are often 
divergent.172  Once there was a widespread commitment to race-neutral 
antidiscrimination, the concept of a black “nation” was inherently unstable, 
and increasingly incoherent. 
                                                                                                                          
167 See generally EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK AMERICA 
(2010) (arguing that the black community has splintered into four groups as prospects have improved 
for the race as a whole).   
168 In 1987, William Julius Wilson famously observed that as de jure discrimination eased, many 
middle and working class blacks left black neighborhoods, leaving behind a group of “truly 
disadvantaged” blacks who were poorly situated to take advantage of the open access regime provided 
by our civil rights laws.  WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1987). 
169 See ROBINSON, supra note 167, at 1–5 (arguing that to the extent there was ever one unified 
black community, contemporary black America has fragmented into separate communities with 
different interests and often inconsistent worldviews). 
170 See id. at 5 (arguing that there are four black Americas: the mainstream middle-class majority, 
a large abandoned minority, a small transcendent elite, and a newly emergent group comprised of 
mixed raced individuals and recent black immigrants); Richard Thompson Ford, Barack Is the New 
Black: Obama and the Promise/Threat of the Post-Civil Rights Era, 6 DU BOIS REV. 37, 47 (2009) 
(examining the divide between the underclass and middle-class blacks who are “well positioned to 
improve their social and economic status by moving into well-paid jobs and into better 
neighborhoods”). 
171 Ford, supra note 170, at 45. 
172 See James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 791, 796 (2011) (arguing that in “the criminal context . . . different portions of the black 
community have interests that are often in direct tension”); see also PEW RES. CTR., OPTIMISM ABOUT 
BLACK PROGRESS DECLINES: BLACKS SEE GROWING VALUES GAP BETWEEN POOR AND MIDDLE 
CLASS 3 (2007), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/Race-2007.pdf (“By a ratio of 
two-to-one, blacks say that the values of poor and middle class blacks have grown more dissimilar over 
the past decade.  In contrast, most blacks say that the values of blacks and whites have grown more 
alike during this same time period.”). 
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B.  Reassessing the Effect of Integration on Equal Protection Law 
Professor Peller’s capture of integration as having footing solely in 
individualistic race neutrality is also problematic because it 
mischaracterizes the extent to which integration, as distinguished from an 
ideology of individualistic race-neutrality, has led to current views of equal 
protection laws.  Critical Race Consciousness argues that “a conservative, 
integrationist approach to race frames American race discrimination 
doctrine.”173  For Peller, the story goes something like this: once middle-
class blacks and liberal whites coalesced around the integrationist ideal as 
the appropriate approach to achieving racial equality, integrationist 
ideology became part and parcel of “mainstream American legal discourse 
about race.”174  This was problematic because the integrationist ideology 
embraced colorblindness and rejected race consciousness.175  Most 
pointedly, Peller asserts that it was the integrationists’ rejection of race 
consciousness that facilitated the Court’s narrow interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.176 
In particular, Peller points to the Court’s resolution of the question of 
what standard should be applied to determine a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  In Washington v. Davis,177 the Court held that a 
plaintiff must establish that the government acted with discriminatory 
intent or purpose in order to state a claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause.178  To support this conclusion, the Court distinguished its treatment 
of de jure versus de facto discrimination in the school desegregation 
context.179  The Court observed that it had always required a showing of 
governmental intent or purpose to segregate or discriminate, that is 
discrimination by law or in order to state a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause.180  Conversely, the Court rejected evidence of de facto 
segregation, segregation that could not be traced to a racially 
discriminatory governmental purpose, as a sufficient evidentiary basis to 
support an equal protection claim.181  Thus, the Court pointedly refused to 
allow plaintiffs to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
using the more relaxed disparate impact standard, i.e., evidence that a 
                                                                                                                          
173 PELLER, supra note 2, at xvi. 
174 Id. at 71, 94–95. 
175 Id. at 72. 
176 Id. at 95. 
177 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
178 Id. at 240–41. 
179 Id. at 240. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. (“That there are both predominantly black and predominantly white schools in a 
community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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particular government action had a racially discriminatory effect.182 
Peller argues that the commitment to integration in legal discourse 
made it difficult for proponents of a disparate impact standard to fully 
articulate the value of that standard as a constitutional norm.183  Peller 
asserts that the choice between the two standards, de jure versus de facto 
integration, entailed a value judgment about “the nature of the status quo of 
race relations.”184  Peller also asserts that the best argument in favor of a 
disparate impact or a de facto standard in the Davis case would have 
required reference to race consciousness, which was an anathema to the 
integrationist approach.185  Consequently:  
Liberal equal protection arguments were defensive and 
apologetic because the race consciousness necessary to apply 
the de facto standard violated the foundational beliefs in the 
rationality of colorblindness, and because the strongest 
arguments for a de facto standard—the distributive justice 
claims of minority communities to proportional participation 
in American life—could not be articulated within the 
confines of integrationist ideology.186 
Peller’s argument recognizes how close the Court came to actually 
adopting a de facto standard in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 
Colorado.187  In fact, the Court effectively did adopt a de facto standard for 
enforcing violations of the Brown desegregation mandate in the South.188  
Like Peller, I wish the Court had adopted the de facto approach Justice 
Powell proposed in Keyes, which would have relieved plaintiffs of the 
burden of establishing discriminatory intent and allowed them to 
demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause “where segregated 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id. at 247–48.  The Court approved the use of a disparate impact standard for showing 
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,  401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971). 
183 PELLER, supra note 2, at 94. 
184 Id. at 92. 
185 See id. at 94 (“In the context of Davis, for example, the best argument against continued use of 
a test that disproportionately screened out black applicants for police positions might have been the 
black community’s interest in having its members serve on the armed force that would be patrolling 
their neighborhoods . . . .”). 
186 Id.  At another point in the book, however, Peller seems to contradict this assertion by 
observing that “[i]n the school context, progressives argued for a de facto test that would make 
constitutional requirements turn on the actual achievement of integration, rather than merely a cessation 
of intentional segregative practices on the part of the government.”  Id. at 115.   
187 Id. at 89. 
188 See Michelle Adams, Racial Inclusion, Exclusion and Segregation in Constitutional Law, 28 
CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3 (2012) (“[T]he court has evidenced far more concern about de facto 
segregation . . . than many scholars and commentators recognize.”). 
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public schools exist within a school district to a substantial degree.”189  But 
it is not clear that advocating from a “race consciousness perspective” 
would have guaranteed such a result, or that the price of obtaining such a 
result would have been worth paying.  After all, the reason why Justice 
Powell does not speak for the majority in Keyes is because he failed to 
attract the more liberal Justice Brennan to his position.  Why?  Because 
Justice Brennan rejected Justice Powell’s quid pro quo agreement to reduce 
or eliminate the use of busing to enforce the Brown mandate.190 
Now, one might take the position that this is just further evidence of 
the hegemonic influence of Peller’s version of the integrationist approach 
at work.  After all, Brennan refused to join Powell because he favored 
busing.191  Thus, Justice Brennan, “the integrationist,” was willing to forgo 
the more “race conscious” de facto interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause in order to forcibly integrate the schools.  But as discussed above, 
the real integrationist approach is both structural in nature and has radical 
potential.  Even if we ignore all of the benefits integration has for children 
of all races and for society more generally, social science research 
indicates that an integrated education increases achievement outcomes for 
minority youth.192  Thus, one way of understanding Justice Brennan’s 
                                                                                                                          
189 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S 189, 224.  While I prefer the de facto to the 
de jure standard for establishing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, I readily understand why, 
as discussed below, Justice Brennan might not have adopted that approach.  
190 See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 940–41 (5th ed., 2006) (explaining the “deal” between Justices Brennan and Powell in 
Keyes).  The proposed deal in Keyes was that: 
Justice Powell, the conservative Democrat from Richmond, Virginia, offered the 
liberal majority headed by Justice Brennan. . . . to eliminate the de jure/de facto 
distinction, which, as a practical matter, would make it much easier to establish that 
school systems were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by operating 
systems with “racially identifiable” schools . . . . In return, liberals would have to 
agree to rein in the use of busing as a remedy.  Justice Brennan rejected this offer, 
preferring to maintain the requirement that plaintiffs must show intent to maintain a 
segregated school system, buttressed by various presumptions. 
Id. at 940–41; see also William Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2101 n.171 (2002) (“Brennan 
offered to redraft his opinion to discard the de facto-de jure distinction, but not at the cost of diluting 
Swann’s approval of busing.  Because he was so opposed to busing for pragmatic reasons, Powell went 
his own way, and his attack on the distinction drew the support only of Justice Douglas in the end.” 
(citations omitted)). 
191 See BREST ET AL., supra note 190, at 941 (noting that Brennan rejected reining in the use of 
busing). 
192 See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Remarks to the Minnesota Education Commission Task Force on 
Integrated Schools: What Social Science Research from the Last 20 Years Says About the Effects of 
Integrated Education on Achievement Outcomes (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.school-
diversity.org/pdf/Mickelson_Minnesota_testimony_12-20-11.pdf (“When compared with their 
otherwise comparable peers who attend schools with high concentrations of low-income and/or 
disadvantaged minority youth, students who attend diverse schools are more likely [t]o achieve higher 
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approach in Keyes is not as an abstract commitment to race neutrality, but a 
constitutional remedy that imploded structural barriers and substantively 
benefited black children. 
Similarly, Justice Powell, who advocated for a de facto approach, 
would seem an odd champion of race consciousness.  Perhaps one 
explanation for his opinion, which accurately observed that the cause of 
segregated schools in metropolitan areas throughout the United States was 
residential segregation and individual migratory patterns,193 is that legal 
doctrine is endlessly malleable and that a constitutional right can easily be 
divorced from a constitutional remedy.194  Justice Powell’s approach would 
certainly have “lowered the bar” with respect to the plaintiff’s burden of 
proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  But then what?  A 
close read of Justice Powell’s opinion in Keyes indicates that the duty on 
the defendant (once a violation of the Equal Protection Clause had been 
established) was to operate an “integrated school system[].”195 
But it is not clear that Justice Powell’s “integrated school system” 
meant actual racial integration of the public schools.  Instead, the duty on 
the defendant under Justice Powell’s de facto regime was to “take 
affirmative steps” to integrate the school system by integrating the faculties 
and administration; assuring quality facilities, instruction, and curriculum 
throughout the school district; drawing attendance zones to promote 
integration; and making school siting, closure, and student transportation 
decisions (i.e., busing) with integration in mind.196  Indeed, Justice Powell 
made clear that “[a] school which happens to be all or predominantly white 
or all or predominantly black is not a ‘segregated’ school in an 
unconstitutional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one.”197  
Thus, the adoption of a de facto approach in Keyes (more relaxed standard 
                                                                                                                          
test scores and grades; [t]o graduate from high school; [a]nd to attend and graduate from college[.]  
Attending a diverse school promotes achievement in mathematics, science, language and 
reading. . . . [These] findings undermine the fiction the integration efforts fail to improve academic 
achievement and that there is little value in pursuing school diversity.”). 
193 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
194 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 
(1999) (exploring the large rights-remedy gap in constitutional torts and arguing that it “fosters the 
development of constitutional law”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and 
Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 877 (2010) 
(asserting that “although the Court insists on individualized injury as a prerequisite for invoking 
judicial intervention, the Court displays increasing indifference to providing individualized remedies 
for persons subjected to an important range of unconstitutional conduct”). 
195 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
196 Id. at 241. 
197 Id. at 227; see also Eskridge, supra note 190, at 2100 (describing an amicus brief Justice 
Powell authored as an attorney on behalf of the state of Virginia in Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg 
Board of Education prior to his ascension to the Supreme Court, in which Powell expressed a 
pragmatic view of busing and argued that the trial judge should not have required the school district to 
engage in “massive busing”). 
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of proof) would not necessarily have led to better or more radical outcomes 
for black children. 
My point here is that legal doctrine is malleable.  The adoption of an 
integrationist ideology in equal protection doctrine would not guarantee 
actual or true integration (although it would help).  Similarly, the adoption 
of a race consciousness approach in interpreting constitutional law would 
not necessarily have guaranteed substantive equality for black people.198  
Instead, the ever-shifting meaning of the Brown decision and the trajectory 
of equal protection doctrine has had more to do with the complex 
interaction of social movements, electoral results, court appointments, and 
white backlash than with integrationists’ ideological “capture” of racial 
discourse.199 
Peller’s discussion of the intent versus impact alternatives in equal 
protection doctrine is not just confined to his critique of the Washington v. 
Davis decision.  Critical Race Consciousness argues that the 
integrationists’ rejection of race consciousness facilitated the ability of the 
Supreme Court to strike down the voluntary student assignment plan at 
issue in Parents Involved.200  Peller’s argument is that the debates in legal 
discourse since the Brown decision took place entirely within the 
integrationist ideology: “that race is an arbitrary characteristic [and that] 
racial justice consists of equal treatment according to race neutral 
norms.”201  The problem was that once state actors stopped explicitly 
discriminating on the basis of race and obtained race neutrality, the only 
“work” that race neutrality and colorblindness could do was to undermine 
or otherwise thwart race conscious affirmative action plans.202  From this 
perspective, the result in Parents Involved is not surprising because the 
voluntary, race-conscious student assignment plan involved in the case was 
                                                                                                                          
198 While the quest to equalize school funding in predominantly minority schools would seem to 
come closest to embodying a race consciousness approach in antidiscrimination law and policy, school 
finance reform is a poor substitute for racial and socioeconomic integration.  See James E. Ryan, 
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 256 (1999) (arguing that not only has “school finance 
reform . . . done little to improve the academic performance of students in predominantly minority 
districts, but also that it may be a costly distraction from the more productive policy of racial and 
socioeconomic integration”). 
199 See Balkin, supra note 132, at 1574 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court[] tend[s], over time, to reflect 
the views of national political majorities and national political elites.  Constitutional doctrine changes 
gradually in response to political mobilizations and countermobilizations.  Minority rights gain 
constitutional protection as minorities become sufficiently important players in national coalitions and 
can appeal to the interests, values, and self-conception of majorities, but minority rights will gain 
protection only to the extent that they do not interfere too greatly with the developing interests of 
majorities.”). 
200 See PELLER, supra note 2, at 89 (arguing that race consciousness in school assignment plans 
was explicitly rejected as a means to achieve racial integration in Parents Involved). 
201 Id. at 72, 95. 
202 See id. at 89–90 (arguing that Parents Involved is an example of modern “colorblindness” 
working against integration). 
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inconsistent with “legal liberal integrationist thinking in law.”203  Thus, for 
Peller, the Court’s ruling in Parents Involved “completes an arc in the re-
interpretation of Brown from a realist, functionalist case concerned about 
the real world impact of race policies on Black students to a ‘principled’ 
symbol of the evils of race consciousness in general.”204 
Peller underestimates the possibilities for progressive outcomes even 
within the prevailing legal and ideological regime.  The meaning of “equal 
protection” has been and continues to be contested, and the various 
opinions in Parents Involved demonstrate that fact.205  In Parents Involved, 
the Court considered the meaning of equal protection.  At issue in the case 
was the constitutionality of two voluntary student assignment plans 
adopted by two public school districts that were intended to reduce racial 
concentration in the schools and “ensure that racially concentrated housing 
patterns [did] not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the 
most desirable schools.”206  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 
ruled that the two plans violated the Equal Protection Clause.207  Roughly, 
there were five votes for the proposition that the two student assignment 
plans violated “strict scrutiny” because they were not narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest.208  But the Court greatly 
disagreed with respect to the propriety of the school districts’ goal of 
achieving racial diversity in the public schools in the first instance.209 
Justice Kennedy provided the critical fifth vote for the majority 
opinion striking the two plans down.210  But he also wrote at length about 
the importance of racial diversity in the public schools and the need to 
eradicate de facto segregation.211  Justice Kennedy described the school 
districts’ compelling governmental interest in a sweepingly broad fashion, 
suggesting that public school districts have a compelling interest in 
“avoiding racial isolation.”212  And he provided examples of a variety of 
facially neutral yet race conscious mechanisms that school districts could 
use to eradicate racial isolation in the schools and achieve a diverse student 
                                                                                                                          
203 Id. at 94; see also id. (“While liberals acknowledge the white power structure’s dominance in 
society, they take the structure in which whites have been privileged as the fixed background against 
which race-conscious remedies are to be seen as exceptional.  In this view, race-conscious state action 
can be appropriate, but only as a remedy for conscious racial bias.”). 
204 Id. at 89–90. 
205 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 707 (2007). 
206 Id. at 725. 
207 Id. at 747. 
208 Id. at 720, 726. 
209 See id. at 760–761 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the dissent’s cited interest is “too 
amorphous,” has “no logical stopping point,” and requires “sheer speculation”). 
210 Id. at 707 (majority opinion). 
211 Id. at 788–89, 793–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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population.213  Justice Stevens was blunt in his dissenting opinion.  He 
openly chastised the Chief Justice for relying on Brown to support a 
decision striking down public school districts’ voluntary integration 
plans.214  According to Justice Stevens, the “Chief Justice fail[ed] to note 
that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the 
history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black 
schools.”215  Justice Stevens accused Chief Justice Roberts of rewriting 
history and twisting legal doctrine to support his position.216  For Justice 
Stevens, Brown could only be understood from a race conscious 
perspective. 
Finally, Justice Breyer’s lengthy dissent hewed to traditional equal 
protection interpretation and yet was explicitly race conscious in its 
approach.  In Justice Breyer’s reading of precedent—the same precedent 
that moved the plurality to the opposite conclusion—“[a] longstanding and 
unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal Protection Clause 
permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve 
positive race-related goals.”217  For Justice Breyer, the Equal Protection 
Clause permits school districts’ voluntary race-conscious measures that 
intend to eradicate racial exclusion and guarantee full citizenship for 
African Americans.218  The reason, according to Justice Breyer, was 
because there was a fundamental difference between racial classifications 
used to include and bring the races together, and those used to exclude and 
keep the races separate.219  Justice Breyer’s dissent is consistent with the 
core substantive claim of integration, which is that exclusion and 
segregation facilitate white supremacy and therefore must be eradicated.  
That the Equal Protection Clause could be open to differing interpretations 
is not inconsistent with that idea. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As I suggested at the outset of this Book Review, one must give 
Professor Peller credit for intervening in this important discussion about 
integration.  Professor Peller’s central achievement is to add value to the 
scholarly discussion about a critical issue: What is the meaning of racial 
justice, and did (and does) integration help us achieve it?  But as I have 
argued, Professor Peller paints an over-simplified, one-dimensional picture 
of integration.  The integrationism versus nationalism framework tends to 
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associate the limits of race neutrality with an integrationist worldview by 
encouraging binary thinking.  But the reality was always more 
complicated.  Not only does fealty to this account invariably produce 
conflict, but it lacks the ability to provide either coherent explanations of 
or adequate solutions for racial inequality in a complex and changing 
world. 
Along these lines, consider the debate about the “Moving to 
Opportunity” petition signed by almost two hundred social scientists 
urging the government to provide housing mobility assistance to 
individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina.220  The petition asserted that 
“[a]s the nation seeks to find housing for the many who have been left 
homeless, our goal for these low-income displaced persons, most of whom 
are racial minorities, should be to create a ‘move to opportunity.’”221  The 
petition cited scientific research indicating that “moving to lower poverty, 
lower risk neighborhoods and school districts can have significant positive 
effects on the well-being and economic opportunity of low-income 
children and their families.”222  The thrust of the petition was to link 
location to opportunity (or lack thereof) and to urge the government to 
provide housing assistance so that persons displaced by Katrina could 
relocate to lower poverty and implicitly less racially segregated 
neighborhoods.223  The petitioners asserted that assisted housing mobility is 
“one of the nation’s most important and under-utilized tools for closing the 
gap between the haves and the have nots.”224  Thus, they advocated that 
individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina be given federal rental housing 
subsidies to facilitate a “move to opportunity.”225 
The Moving to Opportunity petition was controversial.  In 2008, David 
Imbroscio asserted that the petition was a classic example of the reigning 
“Dispersal Consensus” approach to eradicating urban poverty.226  Calling 
such an approach hegemonic, Imbroscio argued that the petitioners have 
“coalesced around the central idea that the only way to make a serious dent 
in ameliorating the plague of urban poverty—not only in New Orleans but 
                                                                                                                          
220 Xavier de Souza Briggs, After Katrina: Rebuilding Places and Lives, 5 CITY & COMMUNITY 
119, 121, 127–28 (2006). 
221 Id. at 128. 
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225 Id.  In a follow-up op-ed piece, one of the main drafters of the petition called for “equitable 
redevelopment” of New Orleans, which would include an “assisted housing mobility program[].”  
Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin Turner, Fairness in New New Orleans, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 5, 
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226 David Imbroscio, “[U]nited and Actuated by Some Common Impulse of Passion”: 
Challenging the Dispersal Consensus in American Housing Policy Research, 30 J. URB. AFF. 111, 112 
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throughout urban America—is to disperse (or deconcentrate) the urban 
poor into wealthier (usually suburban) neighborhoods.”227  Imbroscio 
attacked the social scientists he identified for intentionally exaggerating the 
benefits of moving to opportunity while slighting “evidence suggesting the 
viability of alternatives to it,”228 overestimating individuals’ desire to move 
from inner cities,229 advocating “reeducation” in an attempt to persuade 
individuals to leave their neighborhoods and communities, and repressing 
real freedom of choice by restricting the use of housing assistance to “more 
affluent and possibly predominately white neighborhoods.”230 
The debate about the Moving to Opportunity petition suggests a classic 
binary choice: Should we enrich or integrate? “Gild the ghetto,” or help 
people move out?  Under this now standard account, the debate breaks 
down into another variation of the integrationism versus nationalism 
conflict.  But the integrationism versus black nationalism frame ultimately 
detracts from the quest for racial equality; it erects a false dichotomy.  As 
Xavier Briggs emphasized in his response to David Imbroscio’s critique, 
“[i]mproving the quality of life of the very poor and helping them escape 
poverty are two very different things, but both matter.”231  Along these 
lines, Briggs’s and Margery Turner’s call for “equitable redevelopment” of 
New Orleans did not focus solely on housing mobility.  Indeed, they 
defined equitable redevelopment to include housing mobility and:  
[H]ousing affordable to families at a wide range of income 
levels, measurably better public transportation and other job 
links, schools that are on track to succeed, healthcare access, 
a smart retail mix, business linkages to the regional economy, 
a viable tax base, and more mixed-income communities that 
reflect how urban America can and should function.232 
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To be sure, integration is often criticized and castigated.  To a certain 
extent this is understandable, given the scope and complexity of the 
problem it attacks and the deep-seated emotional, political, and social 
underpinnings of that problem.  Brown v. Board of Education raised 
expectations that were nearly impossible to meet.233  But that does not 
mean that integration itself was a failed and bankrupt strategy from the 
start.  Nor does it mean that integration is not a crucial approach for 
continuing the journey toward racial equality today.  If Critical Race 
Consciousness demonstrates anything, it is that the burden on integration is 
too high.  Over and over again, we have asked integrationists not just to 
fight but to win the war against white supremacy.  But we place no such 
burden on any other strategy designed to achieve racial equality.  
Integration should be understood not as a set of tactical tools for merely 
changing prejudicial views, but rather as a systematic, thoughtful, and 
long-term approach for undermining established racially driven power 
structures.  It envisions nothing less than redressing fundamental societal 
power imbalances, and given the audacity of that goal, we should not 
conclude it has lost the war while the battles are still raging. 
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233 As Robert Carter remarked in his assessment of the Warren Court and desegregation, “Brown 
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